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 In recent years the systems-thinking approach to safety management and 
accident investigation has gained traction with risk managers and those 
international bodies responsible for aviation safety (International Civil Aviation 
Organisation, 1995, 2013; Reason, 1990, 2008, 2013; Tochen & Tobin, 2013; 
Shorrock, Leonhardt, Licu & Peters, 2014). Watershed moments included: 
 
The 1992 publication of The Honourable Mr Justice Virgil P. 
Moshansky’s systems-thinking-informed analysis of the 1989 Dryden 
accident, in which wing ice brought down a Fokker F-28 passenger 
aircraft 
 
The 2009 publication of Mr Charles Haddon-Cave QC’s holistic 
analysis of the loss over Afghanistan of RAF Nimrod MR2 XV230 
(Haddon-Cave, 2009), where a venerable airframe compromised by 
reactive patching (see Weir (1996) for a definition), and safety migration 
(see Rasmussen (1997) and Reason (1997) for definitions), was lost to 
an in-flight fire. 
  
 This paper has two objectives. First, to present a systems-thinking-
informed analysis of the loss on 17 July, 2014, of a Malaysia Airlines Boeing 
777-200 (Flight MH17) over Hrabove, Ukraine (Dutch Safety Board, 2014, 
2015a, 2015b). Secondly, to investigate the degree to which subsequent political 





 Systems-thinking takes in the interactive complexity, non-linear 
interactions and emergent behaviours of socio-technical systems (Dorner, 1996; 
Maurino, Reason, Johnston & Lee, 1998; Hollnagel, 2004; Johnson, 2005; 
Dekker, 2006; Black & Koopman, 2009; Miller, 2009; Shorrock, Leonhardt, 
Licu & Peters, 2014; Griffin, Young & Stanton, 2015). It focuses on the system-
as-found and describes the 'lived reality' of the system in question. Systems do 
not always behave as expected. Non-linear interactions, where small inputs 
generate unexpectedly large outputs, or where large inputs generate 
unexpectedly small outputs, or where, through time, identical inputs generate 
qualitatively different outputs, render system behaviour unpredictable: "In 
complex systems, outcomes are often emergent, and not simply a result of the 
performance of individual system components. Hence system behaviour is hard 
to understand and often not as expected” (Shorrock, Leonhardt, Licu & Peters, 
2014, p. 3). 
 
 According to Miller (2009), risk is a product of interactions at the 
systemic level. Hollnagel’s (2004, p. xv) systems work leads him to conclude 
that "... accidents [should be] seen as emerging phenomena in complex systems 
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... the result of an aggregation of conditions ... ". Dekker (2006, p. 78) observes: 
"[I]t is critical to capture the relational dynamics and longer-term socio-
organisational trends behind system failure". Turner (1978; 1994) argues that 
disasters incubate over time. “[A] multiplicity of minor causes, misperceptions, 
misunderstandings and miscommunications accumulate unnoticed during [the] 
incubation period….ready to contribute to a major failure” says Turner (1994, 
p. 216). 
 
 Actor-network theory’s (ANT’s) ‘principle of generalised symmetry’ 
transforms our understanding of the ‘social’. It posits that all system 
components (animate or inanimate, tangible or intangible) have agency and act. 
In ANT’s conception, the social is ‘materially heterogeneous’. Socio-technical 
systems are purposeful, bounded assemblies of mutually-affecting animate and 
inanimate actants (philosophies, policies, laws, rules, computer software, 
blueprints, components, devices, machines, engineering tolerances, corporate 
financing arrangements, plant operators, shop stewards, managers, training 
plans, beliefs, practices, cultures, aspirations, prejudices, etc.) (Callon & Latour, 
1981; Callon, 1991; Callon & Law, 1997; Risan, 1997). Actor-network theory 
reveals “how things are ‘stitched together’ across divisions and distinctions” 
(Murdoch, 1997, p. 321) to create goal-oriented systems (‘hybrid-collectifs’) . 
Purposeful systems (like that designed to deliver air service across international 
boundaries) emerge from a process of ‘heterogeneous engineering’, whereby 
human and non-human elements (‘actants’) are enrolled/co-opted (‘translated’). 
 
 Like all analytical devices, actor-network theory is not without its 
problems. There are arguments over ANT's treatment of social phenomena like 
power, gender, race and intentionality. Factors like these are either 'flattened' or 
backgrounded by the methodology. In the context of the analysis presented here, 
the most obvious difficulty is deciding the size and geometry (topography) of 
the aviation system network space - that purposeful assemblage of actants that 
delivers air service. Where does one draw one's analytical horizon? Where is 
the system boundary? The more restrictive one's survey, the greater the risk that 
key actants may be overlooked. The more generous, the greater the risk that the 
resulting picture fails to add anything of significance to one's understanding. 
The author reflexively acknowledges that his conceptualisation of the aviation 
system network space (and the resulting systems-thinking-informed analysis) 
may be considered too broad by some, and too narrow by others. Regardless of 
this problem, the author contends that actor-network theory makes an important 
contribution to our understanding of the origins of the MH17 shoot-down by 
suggesting that the disaster, rather than being a 'bolt from the blue', was in some 
degree socially produced. Acknowledging the systemic origins of disaster helps 
us develop effective responses (like institutional reforms or rule changes). 
Interventions that modify precepts and cultures may prove especially effective 
at preventing repeats. 
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 This analysis assumes the ‘aviation system’ – a goal-oriented network 
of mutually affecting actants – to contain the following elements: 
 
Table 1. 
The aviation system network-space – an actor-network theory-informed (ANT-
informed) conceptualisation. 
 
The aviation system network-space 
National governments 
National regulatory authorities (e.g. Federal Aviation Administration) 
Supra-national regulatory authorities (e.g. International Civil Aviation 
Organisation, European Aviation Safety Agency, Eurocontrol) 
Representative bodies (e.g. The International Airline Passengers Association, 
European Cockpit Association, International Air Transport Association, The 
European Low Fares Airline Association) 
Aircraft manufacturers 
Airport authorities 
Products (e.g. aircraft, flight service, loyalty schemes)  
Passenger agendas and expectations 
Investor and shareholder agendas and expectations 
Airline employee behaviour (e.g. adaptability, flexibility, loyalty, 
commitment, integrity) 
Airline and aviation infrastructure financing terms-and-conditions 
Regulatory authorities’ risk perceptions 
Airlines’ risk perceptions 
Passengers’ risk perceptions 
The airline cost base (e.g. the price of fuel, landing charges, salary costs, 
maintenance costs, in-flight catering costs, advertising costs, interest rates, 
etc.) 
Inter-airline competition 
Near-misses, incidents and accidents (like the De Havilland Comet disasters 
of the 1950s) 
Media representations of the industry (e.g. safety, value for money, 




 Reductionism is the antithesis of systems-thinking. Unlike systems-
thinking, reductionism settles for simplistic explanations. Failure is linked to 
discrete actions (like a flight crew’s decision not to de-ice). The desire or, 
according to Horlick-Jones (1996, p. 66), “need” to blame, encourages 
reductionist analyses. Post-disaster reductionist analyses support blamism. In 
the aftermath of disaster, blamism and reductionism often become locked in a 
non-virtuous, unedifying dance. By individuating responsibility for failure, 
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blamism denies the contribution of wider societal and organisational factors like 
political self-interest, bureaucratic incompetence, under-funding, 
indoctrination, poor training and unrealistic deadlines. Blaming produces a 
‘fundamental attribution error’ (Fiske & Taylor, 1984). 
 
 Analyses that settle for simple, reductionist answers to complex 
questions both represent and create latent errors: 
 
Example 1: The reductionist tendency to blame the 2014 ebola outbreak 
on Africa's 'backwardness' meant that other factors, like the 
impoverishment of that continent by Britain, France, Belgium, 
Germany, China and other powerful, self-interested nations went 
undiscussed. In the case of the ebola outbreak, reductionism led to 
victim-blaming. Bennett (2014b) observed: "Seen in the context of 
global power-plays between countries like Britain, China, Russia and 
the United States, the ebola crisis is less a product of Sierra Leone, 
Liberia and Guinea's under-development and associated social, 
economic and political problems than of developed countries' greed and 
ambition. Seen though a systems-thinking lens, ebola is fundamentally 
a crisis of developed nations' exploitative behaviour. Ebola is a crisis of 
ideology". 
 
Example 2: The reductionist tendency to blame US shootings on the 
perpetrators alone means that other salient factors, like the ease with 
which weapons can be purchased or the possible impact on behaviour of 
violent gameplay, go unchallenged. Analysing the case of Veronica 
Rutledge, the Walmart shopper slain by her infant son, Bennett (2015a) 
observed: “Viewed through a systems-thinking lens, US gun violence is 
primarily a social problem rooted in the belief that every citizen 'has the 
right to keep and bear arms'. Veronica Rutledge wasn't killed by her son. 
She was killed by the Second Amendment to the United States 
Constitution”. 
 
 To summarise, systems-thinking, expressed in theories like ANT, is 
counter-reductionist. It examines the impact of contextual factors on decision-
making and behaviour. It reveals the often complex and messy origins of failure. 
In so doing it rejects blamism – a morally dubious and unedifying indulgence 
(Browning & Shetler, 1992; Reason & Hobbs, 2003; Jeffcott, Pidgeon, Weyman 
& Walls, 2006; Woods, Dekker, Cook, Johannesen & Sarter, 2010). Reason and 
Hobbs (2003, p. 97) comment: “Blaming people for their errors is emotionally 
satisfying but remedially useless. Moral judgments are only appropriate when 
the actions go as intended and the intention is reprehensible. Blame and 
punishment make no sense at all when the intention is a good one, but the 
actions do not go as planned”. 
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 This paper presents a systems-thinking-informed analysis of the loss on 
17 July, 2014, of a Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777-200 (Flight MH17) during a 
regional conflict that saw western-backed Ukrainian forces fighting Russian-
backed Ukrainian separatists. Malaysia's 777 was probably destroyed by a 
surface-to-air missile (SAM). The conflict in eastern Ukraine, which intensified 
following Russia's annexation of the Crimea, was in some respects a proxy-war 
(see Ambrose (1985) for a definition of ‘proxy-war’) between Europe and 
Russia. The analysis presented here is deductive and inductive:  
 
It uses systems theory (specifically the ANT iteration) to demonstrate 
that MH17's destruction originated in a range of socio-political and 
organisational factors 
 
It treats the loss as a learning opportunity. For example, lessons are 
drawn from the political and journalistic reaction to MH17's shoot-down 
(an unedifying mélange of unsupported claim and counter-claim). 
 




 According to the Dutch Safety Board (2015a, p. 9): “The in-flight 
disintegration of the aeroplane … was the result of the detonation of a warhead. 
The detonation occurred above the left-hand side of the cockpit. The weapon 
used was a 9N314M-model warhead carried on the 9M38-series [NATO 
designation SA-11 Gadfly series] of missiles, as installed on the BUK surface-
to-air missile system”. Shrapnel ejected by the SA-11 Gadfly killed the flight-
crew. The subsequent explosive decompression and disintegration of the 777 
killed everyone else on board (Dutch Safety Board, 2015a). Both Ukraine and 
Russia operated the SA-11 Gadfly surface-to-air (SAM) missile. The SA-11 can 
carry a 70kg high explosive (HE) fragmentation warhead to 72,000 feet (22,000 
metres) (Jane's Publishing, 2011). At the moment of its destruction, the aircraft 
was flying at 33,000 feet (10,000 metres), 3.6 nautical miles north of airway 
L980's centreline. A fragmentation warhead ejects shrapnel (metal spheres, 
cubes or rods). The thin, pressurised skin of an aircraft offers no resistance to 
shrapnel. 
 
 At the time of MH17’s destruction, relations between Ukraine (and its 
European allies) and Russia were at a low ebb (Kuchins, 2015; Greene, 2015; 
Usborne, 2015). There was fighting on the ground and a war of words in the 
media. Sanctions, travel bans, import bans, asset freezes and other economic 
weapons had been deployed. There were fears of a new Cold War (Deutsche 
Welle, 2014; Levgold, 2014) and of a new Russian tactic – ‘hybrid warfare’ 
(Blair, 2015). A survey conducted in late 2014 (Levada Centre, 2014) confirmed 
a sharp difference of opinion between Ukrainian and Russian respondents over 
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the future of the disputed Donbass region of eastern Ukraine (sometimes 
referred to by Ukrainian separatists and Russians as Novorossiya). Russian 
President Vladimir Putin constructed the February, 2014 ousting of President 
Viktor Yanukovych as a fascist insurrection (thereby invoking the spirit of the 
USSR's 1941-1945 Great Patriotic War against Nazi Germany) (Blair, 2015). 
Kiev's pro-Western lobby constructed the ousting of their fourth president as a 
blow against a self-interested, interfering, backward-looking Russia. Social and 
political schism and armed conflict (Levada Centre, 2014; Gregory, 2014; 
Wintour & Doherty, 2014; Blair, 2015; Kuchins, 2015) formed the backcloth to 
the destruction of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17. Since MH17’s destruction, 
East-West relations have deteriorated further, with Russia withdrawing from the 
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, the US deploying additional 
assets to NATO member states (BBC, 2015) and Syrian-based Russian 
warplanes bombing anti-Assad insurrectionists (some of whom had been armed 
and trained by the West) (Greene, 2015). 
 
MH17 through a systems-thinking lens 
 
 Seen through the actor-network theory (ANT) lens, the MH17 disaster 
originated in history, politics, ethnic division, a regional war, risk 
miscalculation, denialism and interactions between the elements that comprise 
the commercial aviation system. Circumstance, as much as the person who 
pressed the button that launched the missile(s), destroyed the aircraft. The 
following actants contributed to the disaster (this is far from an exhaustive list): 
 
- Russian leaders' distrust of the West (forged in the 1941-1945 Great 
Patriotic War and tempered in the 1947-1991 Cold War, this distrust is 
deep-rooted). By 2015 relations between Russia and the western powers 
were problematic (Kuchins, 2015; Greene, 2015; Usborne, 2015) 
- The Ukrainian Parliament's (Verkhovna Rada's) 2014 decision to 
abolish the 2012 law on state language policy. The 2012 law allowed 
Ukraine's regions to designate languages other than Ukrainian as 
'official' if they were spoken by over 10 percent of the local population. 
Following enactment of the 2012 law, thirteen out of Ukraine’s 27 
regions (most of them in the east of the country) adopted Russian as a 
second official language. Verkhovna Rada's 2014 decision drew 
significant criticism from Western politicians 
- Russian President Vladimir Putin’s determination to embrace the 25-
million-strong Russian diaspora, the ‘russki mir’ (Garton-Ash, 2014) 
- The incommensurate world-views and aspirations of western-facing 
Ukrainians (who sparked the Euromaidan insurrection of November 
2013) and eastern-facing, Russian-speaking rebels 
- The Euromaidan perception that Ukraine's Putin-endorsed President 
Viktor Yanukovych headed a corrupt puppet regime 
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- The Russian State’s perception that Yanukovych had been ousted in a 
thinly-disguised coup d’état 
- A regional war fought on ethnic lines 
- The transformation by the United States, European Union and Russia of 
a regional war into a superpower proxy-war 
- The expansionist tendencies of the European Union 
- The expansionist tendencies of NATO 
- Russia's historic desire to influence, if not control, its 'near abroad'. 
Imperial ambitions persist on the fractious continent of Europe. East-
West buffer states like Ukraine are under the greatest pressure 
- The capabilities of the SA-11 SAM system (accuracy, reach, etc.) 
- The 'normalisation' of shoot-downs since the circa 6 April, 2014 
commencement of hostilities in Donbass (see Appendix). Although 
most of the downed machines were helicopters or ground-attack aircraft, 
larger machines, like the twin-engined Antonov 30 and four-engined 
Ilyushin 76 strategic transport, were also destroyed (Dutch Safety 
Board, 2015a). Whoever fired the missile(s) may have mistaken the 
Boeing 777 for a military jet transport 
- Airway L980. MH17’s off-centreline position (the aircraft had drifted 
3.6 nautical miles north of airway L980's centreline) (Dutch Safety 
Board, 2015a) may have looked suspicious to a SAM missile crew 
(although off-centreline deviations for weather are not uncommon) 
- The shrapnel ejected when the SA-11's warhead exploded in proximity 
to the Boeing 777 
- The vulnerability of modern, pressurised aircraft like the Boeing 777 to 
shrapnel (Dutch Safety Board, 2015a) 
- Governments’ willingness to permit overflights of contested territory. 
The Dutch Safety Board (2015b, p. 14) notes: “In diplomatic circles, 
concerns were expressed about the [2014] armed conflict in the eastern 
part of Ukraine, and the shooting down of military aircraft …. However, 
none of the politicians, officials or services made a connection between 
the military developments in the region and the possible risks posed to 
overflying civil aeroplanes”. Following the disaster, Malaysia’s 
Transport Minister said: “[S]ince [Airway L980] is an approved route, 
it is safe” (Lai as cited in Neate & Glenza, 2014). Following the MH17 
disaster, airlines may wish to reconsider how they read/interpret an 
‘official approval’  
- Airlines' willingness to overfly contested territory. Rietsema (as cited in 
Halsey, 2014) claims: “Airliners overfly conflicted areas all the time”. 
According to the Dutch Safety Board (2015b, p. 16), “In March 2014 … 
one operator decided not to use the airspace above Ukraine …. 
Thereafter, as far as the Dutch Safety Board was able to ascertain, no 
other operators changed their flight routes … ”. However, according to 
Neate and Glenza (2014), prior to the Flight MH17 disaster, five airlines 
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(British Airways, Qantas, Cathay Pacific, Korean Air Lines and China 
Airlines) stopped transiting eastern Ukraine 
- Malaysia Airlines's risk perception and risk calculation in the context of 
its post-MH370 cost-cutting policy. Malaysia Airlines’s "high cost 
base" saw it "bleeding cash" even before the loss of Flight MH370 (Daga 
& Ngui, 2014). In the three years before the MH17 disaster, Malaysia 
had a negative operating cash flow: the carrier was unable to generate 
sufficient income to cover its day-to-day operating costs (Daga & Ngui, 
2014; Hodgson, Al Haddad, Al Zaabi & Abdulrahim, 2015). According 
to the Dutch Safety Board (2015b, p. 15) “[Malaysia Airlines] did not 
perform any separate risk assessment for flying over the conflict area in 
the eastern part of Ukraine” 
- Pilots’ mores. Although a Captain can refuse to fly a route s/he considers 
unsafe, pilots’ decisions balance several considerations, including the 
need to maximise operational efficiency. Captains know that diversions 
increase fuel costs and disrupt tightly-coupled timetables. Waste is 
anathema to an industry with “very low profit margins” (Quintana as 
cited in Neate & Glenza, 2014). Cook (2000, p. 2) notes of those who 
make decisions in complex, risk-laden production systems: “[S]ystem 
practitioners operate the system in order to produce its desired product 
and also work to forestall accidents. This dynamic quality of system 
operation, the balancing of demands for production against the 
possibility of incipient failure is unavoidable. Outsiders rarely 
acknowledge the duality of this role … [T]he outsider’s view 
misapprehends the operator’s constant, simultaneous engagement with 
both roles [my emphasis]”. Bodies that promote the industry to the 
public paint a different picture. Following the disaster, the CEO of the 
International Air Transport Association (IATA) claimed: “No airline 
will risk the safety of their passengers, crew and aircraft for the sake of 
fuel savings” (Tyler as cited in Neate & Glenza, 2014) 
- The policies of supra-national bodies like the International Civil 
Aviation Organisation (ICAO), Eurocontrol and the European Civil 
Aviation Conference (ECAC) that countenance commercial flights over 
conflict zones. Such bodies rely on sovereign states (like Ukraine) to 
produce airspace risk-assessments. In its final report the Dutch Safety 
Board (2015a) urged greater caution in the matter of airspace 
management in times of crisis 
- The risk-assessments of the State Aviation Authority of Ukraine and the 
Ukrainian State Air Traffic Service Enterprise that deemed it safe for 
commercial aircraft to transit the Donbass region at altitudes above 
32,000 feet (MH17 met its fate at 33,000 feet), despite the fact that “two 
of [Ukraine’s] military aircraft had been shot down at altitudes between 
6,200 and 6,500 metres [20,300 – 21,300 ft.] with powerful weapon 
systems [my emphasis]” (Dutch Safety Board, 2015b, p. 15). The 
Chairman of the United Kingdom Flight Safety Committee (UKFSC) 
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notes: “MH17 was in airspace approved by ICAO. Its flight plan was 
approved by the Ukrainian authorities, as well as Eurocontrol” (Brady, 
2014) 
- The failure of national and supra-national regulatory authorities to learn 
from past events, like the 1983 destruction by a Soviet Su-15 fighter of 
Korean Air Lines Flight KAL007, or 1988 destruction by a ship-
launched missile of Iran Air Flight IR655. In both cases, commercial 
airliners were routed near or over known troublespots. Viewed through 
Toft’s (1992) isomorphic learning prism, the KAL007 and IR655 shoot-
downs created a space for active learning 
- The Flexible Use of Airspace concept, which holds that “airspace should 
no longer be designated as military or civil airspace, but should be 
considered as one continuum” (Eurocontrol, 2014) 
- The shareholder agenda (maximise profit and dividend) 
- The passenger agenda (generally to pay as little as possible for a ticket) 
- The conscious post-1970s engineering of a liberalised and highly 
competitive global aviation system (Zellner & Rothman, 1992; Crandall, 
2008). Robert Crandall, CEO of American Airlines, argued that aviation 
is “intensely, vigorously, bitterly, savagely competitive” (Crandall as 
cited in Sherman & Chaganti, 1998, p. 93). He observed: “American’s 
[American Airlines’s] success depends on moving quickly from one 
advantage to the next” (Crandall as cited in Sherman & Chaganti, 1998, 
p. 93) 
- The difficulty of consistently making a profit in such a volatile industry. 
Commercial aviation is plagued by upswing and downswing (Petzinger, 
1995) 
- The aviation system's cost-reduction culture. Cost reduction is a key 
objective of most airlines (Lawton, 2002; Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, 2011; Franke & John, 2011). Today, even state-subsidised 
airlines are expected to pare down costs (Kennedy, 2015) 
 
 Viewed through a systems-thinking lens, the actions of the SAM missile 
crew were but one element of a complex of failures (like allowing commercial 
aircraft to overfly war zones where protagonists possess advanced anti-air 
weaponry). With reference to Turner's (1978) six-stage model of failure we can 
see that the incubation period for the disaster stretched back to (at least) the 
Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.  
 
The aviation system actant-component of the MH17 disaster 
 
 Systems-thinking argues that the origins of disaster are complex and 
messy. "[I]t is better to think of a problem of understanding disasters as a 'socio-
technical' problem with social organization and technical processes interacting 
to produce the phenomena to be studied” says Turner (1978, p. 3). Further, in 
an open system there are n routes to disaster: “[S]ystems theory predicts that 
9
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any open system … can arrive at a given end state … via different routes” (Toft, 
1996, p. 103). This peculiarity of system behaviour is known as equifinality. 
 
 The behaviour of the aviation system contributed to the loss of MH17. 
It was a systems accident (see Reason (2013) for a definition of ‘systems 
accident’), the causes of which included both an error of judgement – a missile 
crew mistaking Malaysia’s 777-200 for a hostile aircraft – and policy decisions, 
including Ukraine’s decision to allow passenger aircraft to overfly a war-zone 
and Malaysia Airlines’s decision to take advantage of the Ukrainian authorities’ 
concession. The origins of the MH17 disaster are to be found in the commercial 
aviation network-space (see table above). With reference to Turner’s (1978; 
1994) work on incubation and system vulnerability, and Reason’s (1990) work 
on latent conditions (resident pathogens), the commercial aviation network-
space (governments, regulatory authorities, airlines, shareholders, customers, 
etc.) incubated the MH17 disaster until, on 17 July, 2014, a missile crew added 
Turner’s ‘trigger event’ and Reason’s ‘active failure’. 
 
 Attributing the disaster solely to a missile crew’s error of judgement is 
too simplistic. The causes of the MH17 disaster lie not only with the decision to 
fire the missile(s), but also with the politics, economics and risk calculations of 
the aviation system’s component parts. Specifically, in the agendas of its 
regulatory agencies, air navigation service providers, airlines, customers and 
investors. It was the aviation system that put MH17 in contested airspace. It was 
the aviation system that exposed MH17’s 298 passengers and crew to the risk 
of shoot-down. The launching of the missile(s) was just one of a number of 
errors-of-judgement that brought down the 777. Had MH17 not been in eastern 
Ukraine it would not have been shot down. Had the aviation system internalised 
the lessons of past incidents and accidents, it probably would not have allowed 
flights through contested airspace. Systems-thinking, which finds expression in 
Toft’s theory of passive and active learning (Toft, 1992; Toft & Reynolds, 
1997), encourages us to think of past events not as footnotes in the historical 
record but as potentially life-saving learning opportunities. Passive learning 
describes a situation where there is knowledge but no remediation. Active 
learning where there is remediation. 
 
The passive learning actant-component of the disaster 
 
 Lagadec (1982, p. 495) observed: “The disaster must not be seen like a 
meteorite that falls out of the sky on an innocent world; the disaster, most often, 
is anticipated, and on multiple occasions”. Most often, disasters are foretold. 
This is certainly the case with that type of aviation disaster known as the shoot-
down. Speaking about the loss of MH17, the Chief Executive of the United 
Kingdom Flight Safety Committee (UKFSC) claimed: “The previously 
unthinkable has happened” (Whittingham, 2014). In fact, the destruction of 
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MH17 was far from unthinkable. Rather, it ‘was anticipated, and on multiple 
occasions’. Harbingers included the following losses and near-misses: 
 
 The destruction of Flight KAL007. In September 1983, a Soviet Su-
15 fighter shot down a Korean Air Lines Boeing 747. Flight KAL007, en route 
from Anchorage to Seoul and carrying 269 passengers and crew, strayed into 
Soviet airspace around the time of a U.S. military reconnaissance sortie. 
KAL007 was at 35,000 feet when the Su-15’s missile hit. The Soviets initially 
denied responsibility. KAL007’s flight-plan saw it skirt some of the Soviet 
Union’s most sensitive military installations, specifically those on Sakhalin 
Island and the Kamchatka Peninsula (Johnson, 1986). Although not war-zones, 
Sakhalin and Kamchatka were hot-zones that should not have been overflown. 
The Soviets claimed that KAL007 “flew deep into Soviet territory for several 
hundred kilometres, without responding to signals [radio calls] and disobeying 
the orders of interceptor[s]” (Sputnik, 1983). It is possible that wider events, 
like Reagan’s tub-thumping rhetoric (Ambrose, 1985; Johnson, 1986; Troy, 
2009), the US deployment of Pershing II missiles to Europe and NATO’s 
imminent Exercise Able Archer, skewed perceptions of KAL007, increasing the 
likelihood of a shoot-down. The cultural milieu (composed of myriad events of 
diverse nature) shapes perceptions (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). Our beliefs, 
experiences, prejudices and memories – concentrated in cognitive 'short-cuts' 
called heuristics – influence how we interpret and react to objective reality 
(Williams, 2007). Heuristics have positive and negative aspects. On the plus 
side they speed information processing. They are ‘fast and frugal’ (Gigerenzer, 
Todd & The ABC Research Group, 1999). On the minus side they can cause us 
to misinterpret signals. Misinterpretation may have severe consequences for 
both subject and object: “[Heuristics] can lead to severe and systematic biases 
that influence the search for information and subsequent interpretations, often 
resulting in less rational … decision-making. This is particularly pertinent when 
making … uncertain or risky decisions” (Williams, 2007, p. 45). Less rational 
decision-making is especially problematic in life-or-death situations, as when a 
missile crew has to interpret a radar plot, or a fighter pilot has to determine an 
aircraft's intentions. 
 
 The destruction of Flight IR655. In 1988, a missile fired from the USS 
Vincennes brought down an Iran Air A300 Airbus en route from Tehran to 
Dubai. All 290 passengers and crew were killed. The aircraft was intercepted in 
Iranian airspace over the Strait of Hormuz. Prior to the shoot-down, there had 
been a confrontation between Iranian small boats and the Vincennes’s 
helicopter. The shoot-down occurred in the context of the long-running Iran-
Iraq war (that saw the United States favour Iraq), attacks on United States 
warships and attacks on commercial vessels transiting the Strait. These events 
may have persuaded the USS Vincennes’s crew that they were watching a 
military aircraft flying an attack profile rather than a civilian aircraft navigating 
an airway. Crewmembers said they believed they were tracking an Iranian F14 
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Tomcat fighter (Bennett, 2001). Events shape perceptions. In hindsight, 
regional aviation authorities should have diverted aircraft around the Strait of 
Hormuz hot-zone. 
 
 The destruction of Flight SB1812. In 2001, Siberia Airlines Flight 
1812 was destroyed by an errant Ukrainian surface-to-air missile. The missile, 
fired during a military exercise, is thought to have overshot a target drone. It 
exploded close to the TU-154M. Seventy-eight passengers and crew perished. 
Following this incident, Ukraine reportedly banned the testing of such systems 
for a period of seven years. Flight 1812, from Tel Aviv to Novosibirsk, was 
intercepted at an altitude of 36,000 feet. Some Russian commentators 
interpreted the MH17 disaster through the lens of the 2001 Siberia Airlines 
shoot-down. By reminding the public of the 2001 Siberia Airlines Flight 
SB1812 shoot-down, commentators were able to present the MH17 disaster as 
an example of passive learning. 
 
The near-destruction of European Air Transport (EAT) Airbus OO-
DLL. In 2003, a EAT Airbus cargo aircraft departing Baghdad International 
was hit by a short-range man-portable 9K34 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin) missile 
at about 8,000 feet. With all flight controls disabled and the aircraft on fire, the 
three-person crew used asymmetric thrust to land the aircraft. 
 
 The three shoot-downs were system accidents. While those who pushed 
the firing button were the instigators, it was the aviation system (see Figure 1) 
that placed the aircraft in jeopardy. Each and every component of the aviation 
system was in some way implicated in the shoot-downs. Had those aircraft not 
been overflying hot or live-firing zones, they would not have been destroyed. 
 
 A systems-thinking interpretation of the KAL007, IR655, Flight 1812 
and MH17 shoot-downs suggests that risk-taking is an emergent property of an 
aviation system predicated on free-market competition and associated profit-
seeking behaviours. Other things being equal, the shorter an airliner’s route, the 
more profitable the service. Perforce, airline managers must strike a balance 
between two imperatives – safety and profit (International Civil Aviation 
Organisation, 2002; Bennett, 2014a). Seen through Hollnagel’s (2009) 
efficiency-thoroughness trade-off (ETTO) prism, the behaviour of the aviation 
industry network-space is unexceptional. An aviation industry that was 
excessively risk-averse or excessively risk-seeking would flounder. Aviation 
wrestles with numerous difficult operational questions, including: ‘How much 
involuntary risk should passengers bear?’ Such questions have ethical and 
economic dimensions. As Cook (2000) notes, those who manage complex 
production systems (like commercial aviation) devote considerable energies to 
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Political and press reaction to the MH17 disaster 
 
 Politicians’ analysis of the MH17 disaster was generally reductionist 
and blamist. Kiev blamed Moscow. Moscow blamed Kiev. Russian President 
Vladimir Putin commented: “The government over whose territory it occurred 
is responsible for this terrible tragedy” (as cited in Stout, 2014). Surveying 
Western reaction, Dejevsky (2014) alleged a “rush to judgement”, citing 
Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt’s account: “Bildt may have been arguing 
in good faith, but his script was peppered with weasel words and phrases, such 
as ‘clearly’ and ‘there is little doubt’, that allowed assumption to masquerade as 
fact” (Dejevsky, 2014). Official communiques were more inflammatory than 
analytical. 
 
 Media analysis was generally reductionist and blamist: “In all, the state-
aligned and state-owned Russian media coverage of the disaster carrie[d] a 
conspiratorial, anti-Western tone, pointing to the Ukrainian government as the 
party at fault and Washington as a puppet master” (Yablokov, 2014). In her 
analysis of media reporting of the MH17 disaster, Oates (2014) investigated 
how two news outlets, Vremya, “the flagship news program on the state-run 
First Channel in Russia” (Oates, 2014, p. 1), and  BBC Online, “one of the most 
popular worldwide news sites” (Oates, 2014, p. 1) reported the story. According 
to Oates, coverage generally concerned itself with the question of who shot the 
777 down. She observed of the BBC's coverage: “Little blame attached to 
Malaysia Airlines for flying through a conflict zone; the airline was primarily 
framed as a victim” (Oates, 2014, p. 12). Coverage had an 'episodic rather than 
thematic' flavour, said Oates. The question of who pulled the trigger dominated. 
According to Koshkin (2014), media coverage amounted to nothing more than 
a one-dimensional blizzard of unsupported claim and counter-claim. The 
unedifying and noisy argument that accompanied the destruction of Malaysia 
Airlines Flight MH17 is unsurprising given that, as Iyengar (1991) notes, 
conflicts and disasters generally foment coverage that is episodic and trite. 
 
 Following publication by the Dutch Safety Board on October 13, 2015, 
of its final report into the MH17 disaster, the war of words between Ukraine and 
Russia continued. On the Russian side, the company that manufactured the SA-
11 Gadfly claimed that the Malaysia Airlines 777 had been destroyed by a SAM 
launched from Ukrainian-held territory: "Two full-scale experiments by the 
Almaz-Antey defence company aimed at recreating the MH17 crash conclude 
the missile that downed the flight was an old BUK model fired from a Ukraine-
controlled area ... " (RT.COM, 2015). Russia’s deputy foreign minister 
impugned the integrity of the Dutch Safety Board, calling its final report an 
“attempt to draw a biased conclusion and carry out political orders” (Ryabkov 
as cited in Yeatman, 2015). On the Ukrainian side, Arseny Yatseniuk, Ukraine’s 
Prime Minister, blamed Russian soldiers (possibly aided and abetted by 
‘drunken’ separatists) for the downing: "In our opinion it was carried out solely 
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from territory controlled by Russian fighters .... [T]here is no doubt that drunken 
separatists are not able to operate Buk systems .... [T]his means these systems 





 On 24 March, 2015, a Germanwings First Officer dived his Airbus 
passenger aircraft into a mountain, killing all on board (Bureau d'Enquêtes et 
d'Analyses pour la sécurité de l'aviation civile, 2015). Lubitz used the Airbus 
aircraft to commit suicide (Bennett, 2015c). When details of Andreas Lubitz’s 
medical history began to emerge, much of the press rounded on the pilot. In 
Britain, front-page headlines from 28 March, 2015 included:  
 
Table 1 
 British tabloid and broadsheet reporting of the Flight 4U9525 disaster. 
 
The Guardian A picture emerges of a man disturbed and ill. Yet 
allowed to fly. 
The Times Killer pilot ‘had made plans to go down in history’. 
Girlfriend was scared of his erratic behaviour. 
The Daily Telegraph Doctor had ordered killer pilot to stay off work on 
day of disaster 
The Independent Pilot ‘had a sick note’ for day he killed 149 people 
Financial Times 
Weekend 
Co-pilot destroyed sick note declaring him unfit to 
fly 
i on Saturday Co-pilot hid illness from his employers 
Daily Express Death crash pilot was depressed and ripped up his 
sick notes 
The Sun Kill pilot tore up flight-day sicknote 
Daily Star Killer pilot’s secret gay torment 
 
 
In failing to reference the broader context to the disaster (pilot indebtedness, 
roster volatility, the possibility of roster-induced acute and chronic fatigue, the 
potential for operations in congested airspace to induce stress, some pilots’ 
belief that reporting sick may be viewed with suspicion, etc. (Bennett, 2014a, 
2015c)) the press again committed the fundamental attribution error. By 
focusing on the First Officer rather than the industry, the Fourth Estate 
distracted attention from potentially relevant factors like pilots’ deteriorating 
employment conditions (Bennett, 2014a, 2015b). Here we have further evidence 









 As an antidote to the blizzard of recrimination that followed the 
Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 disaster, and to reduce the risk of recurrence, 
this paper has presented a systems-thinking-informed analysis (specifically an 
actor-network theory-informed analysis). Actor-network theory teases out the 
interactive complexity, relationality, latent and emergent properties of complex 
socio-technical systems like that which supplies commercial air service across 
international borders. The theory of emergence holds that systems phenomena 
like positive synergy, negative synergy, incomprehensibility, 
miscommunication and non-linear interactions may cause complex socio-
technical systems (for example, the system that provides commercial air service 
across international borders) to behave in unexpected ways. The paper suggests 
that on 17 July, 2014, unexpected and risky behaviours within the European 
commercial aviation network-space led to the destruction over Hrabove, 
Ukraine, of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17. Several of the systemic origins of 
the Flight MH17 disaster were highlighted in the Dutch Safety Board’s (2015a) 
final report. Amongst other suggestions, the Board urged a more cautious 
approach to airspace management and utilisation in times of conflict. According 
to the Board, the current ‘default’ position of states and airlines is that flight is 
always possible: “The international system for civil aviation is based on the 
assumption that, in principle, civil aviation is always possible …. This system 
can provide an incentive to keep … airspace open if potential dangers to air 
traffic are not yet entirely clear. Flying is also the default for operators” (Dutch 
Safety Board, 2015a, p. 250). During crisis or conflict, aviation’s ‘default 
position’ may be considered a latent error. 
 
 The paper suggests that in the aftermath of the MH17 disaster, blamism 
served identifiable political ends for actors like the Russian Federation, 
Ukraine’s warring militias, the United States, the European Union, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), national and international regulatory 
agencies, air navigation service providers (ANSPs) and the airline industry. 
Following Russia’s annexation of the Crimea, the West has used MH17 to frame 
Russia as a paranoid and unpredictable state, and President Putin as a loose 
cannon whose geopolitical ambitions induce him to promote disaffection with 
Western values and provide material support to regimes with dubious human 
rights records (Bashr Al-Assad’s Syria, for example). Russia’s revamped 
Middle East policy, which in the Autumn of 2015 saw it launch air strikes in 
support of Syria’s President Bashr Al-Assad (Greene, 2015), would seem to 
confirm the West’s reading of Putin’s politics. The East has used it to frame the 
USA and the European Union as expansionist powers with designs on Russia’s 
near abroad. The Russians construct NATO as the armed wing of Western 
imperialism. NATO is Russia’s bête noire. 
 
15
Bennett: Framing the MH17 disaster – more heat than light?
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2015
 The paper argues that in the context of systems accidents like the 
destruction of Flight MH17 (and the loss of Germanwings Flight 4U9525), 
blamism serves to distract attention from the broader systemic origins of 
disaster. The paper argues that only systems-thinking-informed deconstructions 
of incidents, accidents and near-misses can provide the sort of fine-grained, 
nuanced analysis essential for effective and durable mitigations. As Gherardi 
and Nicolini (2000) explain, safety is an emergent property of the actor-
network. Safety emerges as “the outcome of the quotidian engineering of 
heterogeneous elements: competencies, materials, relations, communications, 
and people that are integral to the work practices” (Gherardi and Nicolini, 2000, 
p. 11). 
 
 It is hoped that the philosophy and practice of systems-thinking 
(grounded in reflective practice) will appeal to those actors - politicians, civil 
servants and warfighters - who have a direct and immediate influence over our 
lives. Realistically this will not happen when simplistic reductionist analyses of 
disasters like Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 and Germanwings Flight 4U9525 
provide antagonists with easy political capital. If politicians can bring 
themselves to see disasters not as a means of furthering some political ambition, 
but as learning opportunities, the world will become safer. Unfortunately, like 
KAL007, MH17 has become a political football. The Great Game is afoot, with 
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Aircraft destroyed 
Date Aircraft Specification and Role 
16/07/14 Sukhoi Su-25M1 Single-seat, twin-engined ground-attack 
16/07/14 Sukhoi Su-25M1 Single-seat, twin-engined ground-attack 
14/07/14 Antonov 26 Twin-turboprop transport 
12/07/14 Mil Mi-24 Helicopter gunship 
02/07/14 Sukhoi Su-25M1 Single-seat, twin-engined ground-attack 
02/07/14 Sukhoi Su-24 Twin-seat, twin-engined supersonic strike 
01/07/14 Sukhoi Su-25UB Single-seat, twin-engined ground-attack 
24/06/14 Mil Mi-8TV Twin-engined transport helicopter 
21/06/14 Mil Mi-8T Twin-engined transport helicopter 
14/06/14 Ilyushin 76MD Four-jet strategic transport 
06/06/14 Antonov 30 Twin-turboprop photographic reconnaissance aircraft 
05/06/14 Mil Mi-8 Twin-engined transport helicopter 
04/06/14 Mil Mi-24RhR Helicopter gunship 
04/06/14 Mil Mi-24VP Helicopter gunship 
04/06/14 Mil Mi-24VP Helicopter gunship 
04/06/14 Mil Mi-24VP Helicopter gunship 
03/06/14 Mil Mi-24VP Helicopter gunship 
29/05/14 Mil Mi-8MT Twin-engined transport helicopter 
05/05/14 Mil Mi-24P Helicopter gunship 
02/05/14 Mil Mi-8MT Twin-engined transport helicopter 
02/05/14 Mil Mi-24P Helicopter gunship 
02/05/14 Mil Mi-24P  Helicopter gunship 
25/04/14 Mil Mi-8 Twin-engined transport helicopter 
22/04/14 Antonov An-30B Twin-turboprop photographic reconnaissance aircraft 
Note: All the above aircraft were operated by the Ukrainian armed forces 
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